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Abstract. Text passwords are ubiquitous in authentication. Despite
this ubiquity, they have been the target of much criticism. One al-
ternative to the pure recall text passwords are graphical authentica-
tion schemes. The different proposed schemes harness the vast visual
memory of the human brain and exploit cued-recall as well as recogni-
tion in addition to pure recall. While graphical authentication in gen-
eral is promising, basic research is required to better understand which
schemes are most appropriate for which scenario (incl. security model
and frequency of usage). This paper presents a comparative study in
which all schemes are configured to the same effective password space
(as used by large Internet companies). The experiment includes both,
cued-recall-based and recognition-based schemes. The results demon-
strate that recognition-based schemes have the upper hand in terms of
effectiveness and cued-recall-based schemes in terms of efficiency. Thus,
depending on the scenario one or the other approach is more appropri-
ate. Both types of schemes have lower reset rates than text passwords
which might be of interest in scenarios with limited support capacities.
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1 Introduction
Text passwords are the most common means of authentication. Despite this
ubiquity, they have been the target of much criticism. User-created passwords
are highly predictable. Most users compose their passwords solely of lower case
characters, use simple dictionary words or put numbers and special characters at
easy foreseeable places [16, 28]. Furthermore, users have on average 25 accounts,
but only seven passwords [16, 19]. This password reuse raises serious concerns
when considering that many websites transmit and store passwords in the clear
instead of encrypted and cryptographically hashed [3]. Password managers are
in many cases also no solution: They introduce a single point of failure; the
security of password managers depends on the strength of the master password;
and there are portability issues.
These deficits of text passwords motivated many researches to find alterna-
tives. One alternative is graphical authentication. Like text passwords, graphical
authentication schemes are knowledge-based. Their primary goal is to exploit the
vast visual memory of the human brain. Visual memory is superior to memory
of abstract information such as text [23]. Many different graphical authentica-
tion schemes have been proposed and studies have been conducted to assess
their security and usability (e.g. [6, 8, 35]). While graphical authentication is in
general promising there are also drawbacks like efficiency when authenticating.
Therefore, it is important to understand how different schemes perform wrt. to
usability (including efficiency, effectiveness, satisfaction but also memorability)
and security in comparison to each other. Most past studies only provide in-
formation in comparison to text passwords; and as the experimental settings
differ from study to study, this data cannot be used to compare the different
schemes and approaches to each other. The authors of prior comparative stud-
ies either studied only cued-recall-based or recognition base schemes. Also, to
our knowledge, most studies base their configurations of the graphical authen-
tication schemes on the theoretical password space. This is a severe limitation
of such studies and renders a comparison an impossible task, because alterna-
tive schemes that force or persuade users to choose more secure (and therefore
potentially less memorable) passwords are compared side by side with schemes
that let the users choose their passwords freely (and therefore potentially very
insecurely).
Therefore, more basic research is necessary to enable the comparison and to
support decision makers in selecting the most appropriate authentication scheme
for their scenario. In this paper we present the first usability study of multiple
graphical authentication schemes and text passwords that uses the most recent
literature available on the effective password space of the tested schemes as
baseline for the security configuration. Furthermore, this study is among the first
to compare schemes based on recognition and schemes based on cued-recall in
the same experimental setting. The selected graphical schemes are: PassPoints,
PCCP, Faces and Things. Participants were asked to login five times over a
period of 42 days. 337 participants took part. The evaluated usability measures
are derived from the measures used in prior literature and therefore allow a
comparison to existing research. The results of the experiment are:
– Usability-wise: The results demonstrate that recognition-based schemes have
the upper hand in terms of effectiveness and cued-recall-based schemes in
terms of efficiency. We also show that with only one exception the graphical
schemes in our study have significantly lower reset rates than text passwords.
In addition, we found evidence that male participants like the graphical
schemes better after longer times of usage, while female participants find
text passwords easier to use. Yet, female participants are more willing to use
graphical password schemes than male participants.
– Security-wise: The analysis of the actual password space shows how difficult
the prediction of effective password spaces is and that further research is
necessary to better judge on the security level of some schemes. The estimates
from our study can serve as baseline for configurations in future studies.
– Comparison to prior studies: Our study provides evidence that no significant
quantitative difference between the performance of male and female partici-
pants exist, as the results of prior studies could not be replicated. However,
significant differences in the attitude towards the schemes exist.
2 The password space
The password space of an authentication scheme is the set of all passwords and
therefore closely related to the guessing resistance of the scheme. The larger the
password space, the more guesses (on average) are necessary to find the right
password. However, it is important to distinguish between the theoretical and
the effective password space. While the theoretical password space includes all
possibly selectable passwords for a scheme, the effective password space com-
prises only the subset of passwords which are likely to be actually chosen. Often
the effective and theoretical password spaces are different. The only definitive
exception in this regard are system assigned random passwords. Yet, these are
not applicable in many scenarios as such passwords are usually more difficult
to remember. Assessing the effective password space can be difficult, because a
sufficiently large sample of passwords is needed to derive any meaningful infor-
mation on frequently appearing values [21].
Multiple metrics have been proposed to compare and predict the password
spaces of different schemes. The measure most often used to assess the size of the
effective password space is the Shannon entropy of recorded password samples
[28]. It is also the basis for the recommendations in the NIST Electronic Authen-
tication Guideline and has been used in research of text passwords (e.g. [22, 28])
as well as graphical passwords (e.g. [9]). However, it has been found, that nei-
ther the NIST estimates nor Shannon entropy provide truely reliable estimates
and represent more a “rule of thumb” than an accurate metric, especially since
sample sizes in typical usability studies are far smaller than what would be de-
sirable [21, 33]. Kelley et al. [21] proposed guess-number calculator and Bonneau
[2] proposed α-guesswork as more robust and reliable metrics, but for none of
these two empirical values for graphical passwords are available. Thus, in the the
absence of viable alternatives, Shannon entropy is used as measure to configure
the schemes in this study.
3 Graphical passwords
Like text passwords, graphical passwords are knowledge-based authentica-
tion. Today’s research distinguishes between three types of graphical password
schemes, named after the way they strain the users’ memory: purely recall-based
schemes, cued-recall-based schemes, and recognition-based schemes. We decided
against including purely recall-based schemes like Draw-A-Secret (DAS) [20] in
our study, since such schemes have been shown to be insecure [24]. In the fol-
lowing we briefly describe the cued-recall-based and recognition-based schemes
we included in the study.
(a) PassPoints and PCCP (b) Faces (c) Things
Fig. 1: The interfaces of PassPoints and PCCP (marker of the click point not
visible during normal operation), Faces, and Things.
3.1 Cued-recall-based schemes
Graphical authentication schemes based on cued-recall use the graphical ele-
ments as cues to support the users’ recall. Wiedenbeck et al. proposed PassPoints
[35] whose basic working principle is the definition of click-points on an image.
The image only serves as a cue for the user, the actual password is composed
of the coordinates of the click-points. During authentication, the same image as
during enrollment is displayed and the user has to select her/his click-points in
the right order. Even with the image as cue, perfect cursor positioning cannot be
expected from the user. Therefore, a tolerance margin around each click-point
compensates small imprecisions by the user.
To avoid click-point patterns in PassPoints, Chiasson et al. proposed an im-
provement called Cued Click-Points (CCP) [4]. Instead of multiple click-points
on one image, in CCP users create multiple click-points, each on a different im-
age. During authentication one image is shown after the other and depending on
where on the image the user clicks, either the correct next image of her/his pass-
word is shown (when the right click-point was selected) or an image for which
s/he has not created a click-point before (when the input was incorrect). In the
latter case, authentication has to be finished regardless, but the legitimate user
can detect her/his error. To counter so called hot-spots (points that have been
noticed to be chosen significantly more often than other click-points), Chiasson
et al. proposed Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP) [4]. In the authentication
phase, they employ persuasive technology by means of an additional viewport
during enrollment. While the system offers the possibility to shuffle the viewport,
the authors found that the number of hot-spots is significantly reduced and the
distribution of click-points in PCCP does not significantly differ from a random
distribution [4]. PassPoints and PCCP have an extensive coverage in research
literature enabling estimates for the effective password space. Therefore, the two
schemes were selected for the usability study. Figure 1(a) shows the interface of
the two schemes.
3.2 Recognition-based schemes
In recognition-based authentication schemes users need only to recognize their
password among a variety of choices, which substantially decreases the required
mental effort. Passfaces is the most popular recognition-based scheme [26] and is
commercially available. During enrollment, the system assigns the users several
facial images as their passwords. During authentication, as many grids of facial
images as there are faces in the user’s password are displayed one after another.
In each grid, the user has to identify the image belonging to her/his password.
Thus the whole authentication consists of multiple rounds, one for each face in
the password.
The same technique as used in Faces was also attempted with objects other
than faces [11, 18]. Due to its strong coverage in the literature we included a
Passfaces-like scheme in the study, which is subsequently referred to as Faces
(see Fig. 1(b)); as well as a scheme using objects, which is subsequently referred
to as Things (see Fig. 1(c)).
4 Related work
In the following we briefly discuss selected related work. Chiasson et al. present in
[4] a comparison of the three graphical cued-recall-based authentication schemes
PCCP, CCP and PassPoints. They cover usability and security aspects with
results from eight user studies. Their results indicate no significant differences
in success rates between the three schemes. The timings they recorded are 6-8
seconds for PassPoints and 8-15 seconds for PCCP. The configurations in all
studies are based on the theoretical password space.
Hlywa et al. present a comparison of multiple Passfaces-like recognition-based
graphical authentication schemes in two web-studies [18] in which recognition-
based schemes are configured to password-level security. The schemes used in the
study of Hlywa et al. differ only in the type of images. One scheme used faces
(similarly to Faces), one scheme used everyday objects (similarly to Things) and
one scheme used houses. Both of their studies used configurations similar, but
not identical, to those in our experiment. One study used 4 by 4 grids, but
instead of a password length of 7 rounds Hlywa et al. used 5. Their other study
used a different approach to the grid size, but was configured to use the same
password space, namely 228. In both studies system-assigned passwords were
used. They report significantly faster login times for their objects participants
than for their faces participants in both studies.
Stobert and Biddle compared in [29] the performance of text passwords as
well as recall-based and recognition-based graphical passwords. Their results
indicate, that recognition-based passwords had a higher memorability, but their
usability was limited by longer login times. Our methodology differs from the one
employed by Stobert and Biddle in two key aspects. Firstly, we consider already
proposed schemes (some of them used in the wild), while Stobert and Biddle
specifically designed a new scheme to compare the different types of memory
Scheme Configuration Hexp
Text 8 characters length, policy based on basic8survey [22] ∼ 27.19
PassPoints 4 click-points, 600x400 px resolution of image, 9x9 px tolerance
margin [9]
. 26
PCCP 3 click-points, 570x380 px resolution of images, 19x19 px toler-
ance margin
∼ 27.7
Faces 7 grids of 16 images each, facial images ∼28
Things 7 grids of 16 images each, object images, semantically grouped ∼28
Table 1: Configurations (Hexp = expected Shannon entropy in bits)
retrieval. Secondly, we base the security configurations of the schemes we use on
the effective password space, rather than the theoretical password space.
Schaub et al. analysed and described the design space for graphical pass-
words on smartphones [27]. To test their design metric, they conducted a non-
longitudinal lab-based user study with five different graphical password schemes
and PINs. Their schemes’ configurations are based on the theoretical password
space rather than the effective password space. Also, their usability metrics use
different definitions. Therefore, the comparability to this study is very limited.
5 Configuration of the schemes
For the configuration of the schemes we decided to focus solely on the effec-
tive password space. Other attacks such as spyware, shoulder surfing and social
engineering, (e.g. mentioned by [31]) were not considered in our study.
Most major websites use password policies resulting in a minimum of about
20 to 28 bits of entropy (or password spaces of 220 to 228 respectively) [17]. Thus,
configuring the authentication schemes’ effective password spaces to lie within
these two values is a close approximation to a lower bound to what would actually
be seen in the wild. However, we wanted to narrow down the range for our study.
To do so, we analysed Komanduri et al. research on password policies for text
passwords and their resulting effective password spaces [22]. They present only
one policy whose effective password space lies between 20 and 28 bits of entropy,
namely their basic8survey policy, for which they report an entropy of 27.19 bits.
Therefore, we decided to use this value as baseline and configure the password
spaces of all schemes to lie between 227 and 228 or as closely to that target as
possible. Table 1 lists all schemes with their configurations. A justification for
each scheme is given below in the respective subsections.
5.1 Text password
The basic8survey policy of Komanduri et al. only states “Password must have at
least 8 characters” and does not offer any scenario to the participants [22]. For
this policy they reported 27.19 bits of entropy. We used this policy as starting
point. We slightly modified it due to some design considerations: Most impor-
tantly we made the policy look more like as if it could be from one of the major
websites investigated in [17] and additionally enforced a fixed length of 8 charac-
ters. Our password policy was included in the introductory text for the scheme
and stated the following rules:
1. The passwords are case sensitive. For instance, ”EXAMPLE” and ”Exam-
ple” are two different passwords. When choosing a password, remember the
capitalization you use.
2. The password must be exactly 8 characters long.
3. Try to not use passwords that are easy to guess, for example ”password”.
4. Even though it is not a requirement, try to add a number or special character
to your password.
5. Choose a new password, that you are not using for any other service.
The first statement is merely a further explanation of the scheme and not a
policy rule, it is often found in policies on the Internet. The first actual policy
rule regards the password length and is taken from Komanduri et al. [22], but
was changed to a fixed length of eight characters. This was done as all graphical
schemes can only be configured in such a restricted way. Rules 3 and 4 were
added as incentive for the participants to not create ”just study passwords”
whose main purpose was to be not forgotten. This decision was made in con-
junction with the decision to include priming in the study methodology. The
last rule was intended to motivate the participants to deal with a new password
throughout the study, just as the participants of the other groups would have
to. Additionally, the system enforced to choose passwords not mentioned in the
policy (e.g. ”password” as mentioned in the third rule could not be chosen).
5.2 Cued-recall-based schemes
The alphabet A of the cued-recall-based schemes is the number of distinct click-
points on the image. This number is determined by the size of the image divided
by the tolerance margin. The theoretical password space P can be calculated
from the number of click-points c required by the system: P = |A|c.
PassPoints. The empirical entropy estimates of Dirik et al. in [9] seem to be
the only findings for PassPoints passwords allowing an estimation of the effective
password space. Therefore, we decided to adopt their PassPoints configuration
and use an image with a resolution of 400x600 px. However, we follow prior
studies, which argue to use 9 px for the tolerance margin instead of 10 px as
an uneven number can be centered around one pixel while it is is unclear how
this should be done for an even margin [4]. Regarding the image, we decided to
use the people image used by Dirik et al. as the sole image for our PassPoints
implementation, as it scored best in their evaluation. They report an observed
entropy of 6.5 bits for a click-point on that image. The authors remark that
these values are only valid for multiple click-points if independence between
the click-points in the password is assumed and that the actual entropy should
be assumed to be lower. Seemingly no data on the magnitude of dependence
between click-points in PassPoints passwords is available in published literature.
Therefore, we decided to use four click-points, as the resulting entropy value of
26 bits (password space of 226 respectively) is closer to the target than any other
number of click-points.
PCCP. According to Chiasson et al. the distribution of click-points in PCCP
does not significantly differ from a random distribution [5]. Therefore, it can be
assumed that the theoretical and the effective password space are approximately
identical. We decided to use three click-points on 570x380 px images with a 19
px tolerance margin for the PCCP implementation, which results in an expected
entropy of 27.7 bits and thus meets the entropy target. The tolerance margin
of 19 px was chosen, as this value achieved better usability ratings than viable
alternatives [34]. The image size was chosen as a multiple of the tolerance mar-
gin and determined in conjunction with the number of click-points to model the
target entropy values of 27 to 28 bits as good as possible. Priority was given to
image size, as it was shown that larger images lead to less clustering in PCCP
[30]. As the images used in previous studies by Chiasson et al. could not be made
available for our study due to copyright concerns, all images for the implementa-
tion were taken from the same source as the image for PassPoints. The viewport
size of 75 px was adopted from [5]. We decided to restrict user choice by omitting
the possibility to shuffle the viewport for the following reason: Chiasson et al.
report that most participants either do not shuffle at all or they shuffle a lot
in order to circumvent the persuasion mechanism. The latter case negates the
security advantage of PCCP over PassPoints.
5.3 Recognition-based schemes
Recognition-based schemes suffer from predictability issues if users are allowed
to choose their passwords themselves [7]. Consequently, commercial implementa-
tions assign random passwords to the users. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no
entropy estimates for the configurations of Things and Faces are available. Thus,
we decided to assign random passwords to the participants for both recognition-
based schemes as recommended by [10, 13, 18]. Then, the theoretical and effective
password space P from the alphabet A (comprised of the images in one grid)
and the number of required authentication rounds r is: P = |A|r. To reach the
entropy target of 27 to 28 bits, we decided to use a 4x4 grid and 7 rounds, i.e.
a password space of 167 = 228.
Faces. All images used were taken from the Face of Tomorrow project which
were also used by other studies regarding facial recognition in authentication [13,
18]. We ensured that all grids had images with similar backgrounds and that faces
used in one grid were of people from the same ethnicity.
Things. The Things scheme used semantically grouped images, following
the work of Weinshall and Kirkpatrick [32]. They found that pictures should
not be too similar to one another or users would start confusing them and
consequently advise to select “pictures with a clear central subject or action and
[. . . ] differences within the group” [32]. Therefore, this criteria was applied to
all images gathered for the Things scheme. All images were informally reviewed
to fulfill this criteria by colleagues uninvolved in the selection.
6 User study methodology
Due to the high relevancy of web-authentication, it was decided to conduct an
online web-based study. Each participant had to complete five sessions over a
period of about 42 days. The intervals between the sessions prolonged, namely
they were: 1 day, 3 days, 7 days, 30 days. The first part of each session comprised
the interaction of the participants with their assigned authentication scheme: ei-
ther creation or authentication. Creation was divided into five phases: (1) the
participants entered their user name, (2) an introductory text was shown, (3)
the participants created their passwords or the system-assigned passwords were
generated, (4) participants could review their new passwords, and (5) a short
training to familiarize the participants with their new scheme and to confirm
the password. Authentication had two phases: first the participants entered their
user name, then they entered their password. A short questionnaire, investigat-
ing the participants’ impressions regarding the usability and security of their
assigned scheme, concluded each session. The participants had a 24 hour win-
dow to complete each session. Participants were informed of their sessions by
email and reminders were sent out if they had only 5 hours left in their 24 hour
window. If at any point during authentication or creation a participant could not
remember her/his password, s/he could reset it via an automated procedure on
the website. To motivate participation throughout the whole study, a raffle was
held for all participants who completed all five sessions. The study was available
in English and German. The methodology of this usability study conforms to
all requirements of our university’s ethics committee. Only the data relevant to
our analysis was recorded and participants could request deletion of their data
at any time. No additional scenario was presented to the participants, they were
fully primed in terms of the password schemes. Fahl et al. have shown that this
procedure is scientifically sound [14]. Additionally, Bonneau found that security
motivations such as registered payment information has no greater impact than
demographic factors [2].
6.1 Participants
Participants were assigned to their schemes using stratified sampling of three fac-
tors: the participants sex, the language the participant enrolled in and a 5-point
Likert value of the participant’s self-assessed experience in password security.
The participant’s sex was chosen as factor due to previous literature suggesting
differences in performance between male and female users [6]. The language the
participant enrolled in was chosen as a factor to prevent bias originating from
the translation of the questionnaires as well as the instructions explaining the
study’s procedure and the operation of the authentication schemes to the partic-
ipants. The self-assessed experience in password security was chosen as a factor
due to an evaluation of questions regarding the participants’ real life passwords,
which is not part of this paper.
Participants were recruited internationally in various ways, including, but
not limited to, flyers and posters on campus, mailing lists, forums and social
networks. All participants had to enroll on the study’s website using a registra-
tion form. No paid services such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk or CrowdFlower
were used. Overall 337 participants registered for our study and confirmed their
email address. Of those 250 were male and 87 female. Participants registered
in both languages available in the study, namely 262 participants used German
texts and 75 used English texts. The age range was 14 to 67 years (mean = 27.6,
median = 25). Almost half the participants (46.5%) reported to have experience
in the field of password security (scores of 4 or 5 on a 5-point Likert scale).
6.2 Recorded measures
The recorded usability measures are aligned along the ISO 9241-11 criteria ef-
fectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction.
Effectiveness. The first measure regarding effectiveness is the success rate.
To retain the highest degree of comparability to past research, we follow the
best practices of Biddle et al. in [1] and report success rates after the first and
after the third attempt. Additionally, this study includes overall success rates
(no limit on the attempts), as this is the most frequently reported measure in the
literature. In this study success rates are defined as follows: the rate of partici-
pants having successfully authenticated after a certain amount of attempts (one,
three, no limit) to the total number of participants using the scheme. The second
effectiveness measure is the password reset rate. It describes the average number
of resets per participant which is a more comparable measure than absolute val-
ues due to different numbers of participants assigned to the different schemes.
We also report dropout rates, which is the number of participants dropped out
in relation to the total number of participants assigned to a scheme. Note that
the dropout is a rather unreliable measure of effectiveness, especially considering
the narrow 24 hours time frame participants had to complete each session.
Efficiency. The first efficiency measure recorded during our study is the in-
teraction time in seconds. It only counts the time for the actual interaction with
the system and not the time the participants’ browsers need to load the images.
This prevents unpredictable bias due to different Internet connection speeds. The
second measure of efficiency is the number of attempts needed, which represents
the efficiency measure for each session. This measure complements the interac-
tion times, which are the efficiency measure for each attempt. In order to assess
the overall efficiency of the schemes, the two aforementioned measures (interac-
tion times and number of attempts) are combined to calculate expected average
total authentication times. This measure is what comes closest to traditional
authentication timings which measure the time for the overall login procedure
(from login request to completed login). However, it has to be stressed that this
is an approximation of what is to be expected for the average participant. Yet,
it offers a much better comparability between the schemes than the traditionally
reported timings, which often depend on the schemes’ implementations (i.e. load-
ing times, etc.). The time needed to read the instructions is the total time across
all sessions to account for participants who had to reset their password and read
through the instructions again. These times are also reported in seconds. This
measure serves as an indicator regarding the learnability of the schemes. In or-
der to spot implementation issues and gather information on possibly necessary
improvements of the schemes’ implementations, the analysis also examines sys-
tem times. These predominantly include the time the system needs to load the
necessary contents (in particular the images) from the study server. The system
times complement the interaction times to detect usability issues caused by the
technical side of our implementations.
Satisfaction. Questionnaires at the end of each session captured the par-
ticipants’ satisfaction with their assigned scheme. The questions concerned the
participants’ attitude and impressions regarding the usability and security of
their scheme. The majority is implemented using a 5-point Likert scale (5 rep-
resents strong agreement and 1 represents strong disagreement).
7 Results
In the following we describe the results of our usability study. The first section
concerns itself with the validity of the security assumption (i.e. whether the
target entropy values were reached). Then we present the usability results along
the lines of the criteria effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction of ISO 9241-11.
7.1 Validity of the security assumptions
In order to check the validity of our assumptions regarding the effective password
spaces, we calculated empirical entropy values for all schemes. As we already
explained in section 2, due to the small password samples the estimates reported
below should only be seen as approximations of the actual differences in the
effective password spaces of the schemes. The values of the recognition-based
schemes, whose passwords were randomly assigned to the participants, can serve
as an indication regarding this deviation. Table 2 shows for each scheme the
expected entropy values derived from published research and the empirical values
calculated for the passwords of our study.
Text passwords. Table 2 shows the entropy estimates calculated from the
study text passwords according to [28] and the value reported by Komanduri et
al. for their basic8survey policy. With an entropy of 27.41 bits the text passwords
created by the participants of our study are very close to the target of 27.19 bits.
PassPoints. Table 2 lists the entropy values calculated from the PassPoints
passwords according to Dirik et al. in [9] as well. Entropy values are calculated
for each click-point position in the password (analogously to the character po-
sitioning in text passwords). These values come very close to those of Dirik et
al. but undercut them. Also, the value is calculated under the assumption that
the choice of all click-points is independent from the other click-points chosen in
Target Calculated
Text 27.19 27.41




Table 2: Target and empirical entropy values in bits
the same password. This is not a reasonable assumption [9], but still the target
entropy is not reached.
PCCP. The calculated empirical entropy of the PCCP passwords in our
study is 17.35 bits and thus far below the target value of 27.69 bits. This result
deviates considerably from what was expected.
7.2 Usability Evaluation
The following three sections present the results of the usability evaluation. Most
of our data is not normally distributed and/or has heterogenous variances. There-
fore, we use robust alternatives to standard tests as suggested by Field [15],
Erceg-Hurn and Mirosevich [12] and Wilcox [36] in favor of data transforma-
tions. In detail, the used tests were Fisher’s Exact Test (FET), the ANOVA-
type statistic tests (ATS) developed by Brunner et al. and implemented in the
R packages WRS by Wilcox and nparLD by Noguchi et al. [25] as well as Cliff’s
test (Cliff) as described by Wilcox in [36]. All multiple comparisons use Holm-
Bonferroni corrected α-levels. Also, in order to cope with the outliers in the
timing data (where participants would leave the session open and return after
some time to continue the session), we used robust measures of location in fa-
vor of the mean. The standard errors are also calculated with regards to these
robust measures of location. Readers unfamiliar with these statistical methods
can find further information in appendix A if desired. All factors and their in-
teractions not mentioned in the results were analyzed, but left out since they
did not show significant results. Figure 2 shows all effectiveness measures and all
efficiency measures. These aspects are discussed in more detail in the following
paragraphs.
Effectiveness. The effect of the assigned scheme on the success rates is
significant after the first attempt (FET: p < .001). Significant differences occur
for the pairs Text-PassPoints (FET: p = .006), Text-PCCP (FET: p. = 001),
PassPoints-Faces (FET: p < .001), PassPoints-Things (FET: p < .001), PCCP-
Faces (FET: p < .001) and PCCP-Things (FET: p < .001). From the results of
follow-up Fisher’s tests, a bipartition after the first attempt becomes apparent:
PassPoints and PCCP (lower group) display both significantly worse success
rates than Text, Faces and Things (upper group). After three attempts the
effect of the assigned scheme on the success rates is again significant (FET:












































Fig. 2: Measured Results
between the upper and the lower group. In detail, significant differences are
found for the following pairs: Text-Faces (FET: p < .001), Text-Things (FET:
p < .001), PassPoints-Faces (FET: p < .001), PassPoints-Things (FET: p <
.001), PCCP-Faces (FET: p < .001) and PCCP-Things (FET: p < .001). For
the overall success rates (no limit on the attempts considered), the effect of the
assigned scheme on the success rates is also significant (FET: p < .001). However,
the bipartition is lost. PassPoints scores lowest with significant differences to
all schemes except Text. The Text group also shows significant differences to
the recognition-based schemes: Text-Faces (FET: p < .001) and Text-Things
(FET: p < .001). In the overall scores, the recognition-based schemes show
the best scores. PCCP scores only non-significantly worse. The Text scheme
shows significant differences to the recognition-based-schemes, but not to PCCP.
Detailed success rates for each session after one attempt, three attempts and
overall can be found in appendix B for closer inspection.
As becomes apparent from the reset rates depicted in Fig. 2(a), the variation
in the number of password resets is very large: the reset rates vary from 0.3 to 0.
A Fisher’s test shows that the effect of the assigned scheme is highly significant
(FET: p < .001). Upon examining the scores of the schemes, a partitioning in
three groups becomes apparent. Text and PassPoints show the highest reset rates
(0.25 and 0.30). PCCP displays a rate of 0.11 and the recognition-based schemes
show the best rates with 0.00 (Faces) and 0.04 (Things).
Figure 2(a) also shows dropout rates for the schemes. The scheme with the
highest dropout rate is PassPoints (60%), the one with the lowest is Things
(39%). The differences in dropout between the schemes are however not signifi-
cant. The most important reason for dropout is the 24 hours time frame partic-
ipants had to return to the study website and complete their session. 53.7% of
all dropout can be attributed to this time frame.
Efficiency. From the interaction times plotted in Fig. 2(b) it becomes clear,
that for recognition-based schemes it takes much longer to enter the password.
A three-way ATS test shows significant main effects for the assigned scheme
(H(4.32, 43.24) = 55.59, p < .001) and the session (H(2.82) = 5.05,p < .001).
For the assigned scheme, the only non-significant difference is between Faces and
Things. The Text group shows the lowest interaction times. The second lowest
score is the one of the PCCP group, then follows PassPoints and last are the two
recognition based schemes, whose interaction times were twice to three times as
high. Regarding the sessions, the only significant differences are between session
2 and 4 and between session 4 and 5. Participants needed longer in the second
session, than in the third and fourth, but need the most time in the fifth session.
A table with a more detailed breakdown of the interaction times of each session
can be found in appendix B.
The second efficiency indicator beside the interaction times is the number of
attempts needed. The main effects of the assigned scheme (H(3.90, 29.27) = 4.98,
p = .003) and the sessions (H(2.35) = 5.34, p = .002) are significant in an
ATS test. The values for the different schemes are depicted in Fig. 2(b). For the
assigned scheme, the significant differences occur for the pairs Text-PCCP (Cliff:
p = .004) and Text-Faces (Cliff: p = .002). Concerning the sessions, participants
needed more login attempts in the later sessions (4 and 5) than in the earlier
sessions. The significant differences for the sessions occur between sessions 2 and
5 (H(1) = 12.25, p < .001), between sessions 3 and 5 (H(1) = 14.19, p < .001)
and between sessions 4 and 5 (H(1) = 14.27, p < .001).
While no total authentication times were recorded, expected average total
authentication times can be approximated from the average number of authen-
tication attempts and the average interaction times. The two factors “assigned
scheme” and “session” are considered in this calculation. As in neither of the
two relevant analyses the participants’ sex shows a significant effect, its influence
can be neglected. The resulting times are depicted in Fig. 2(b) alongside the in-
teraction times. A table with all the values in detail can be found in appendix
B. The advantages and disadvantages of some schemes in both analyses more
or less annihilate. It is still expected for users of the recognition-based schemes
to take twice as long as users of other schemes. However, e.g. the advantage of
the Text group over PCCP in the interaction times is eaten up by the higher
number of attempts needed in the later sessions. However, this measure should
only be seen as an approximation and therefore be treated with caution.
Female participants took on average significantly more time to read the in-
structions (123.27 sec) than males (97.22 sec) did (H = 968.71, p = .029). This
is the only measure for which the participants’ sex had a significant main effect.
The effect of the assigned scheme is non-significant, as is the interaction. This
indicates no significant difference in the learnability between all schemes.
Even if interaction times are low, participants might discard a scheme as
unusable, if the system itself takes too long to respond. Figure 2(b) shows the
system times for all schemes. An ATS test shows a significant result for the
assigned scheme. In fact, all differences except the one between Faces and Things
are significant.
Satisfaction. The participants’ attitude towards the system was investi-
gated using questionnaires. Figure 3 shows a summary of the average answers
to the following 5-point Likert questions: (Q1) The password scheme is easy to
use, (Q2) I could remember my password easily, (Q3) Entering my password was
fast, (Q4) The creation of my password was easy, (Q5) I think I can remember
my password easily, (Q6) I think I can remember my password more easily than
passwords I normally use, (Q7) I prefer this new password scheme to my previous
passwords, and (Q8) I would recommend this password scheme to others.
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
 Text 4.25 3.78 4.02 3.71 3.53 2.61 2.45 3.10 1
 PassPoints 3.92 4.08 3.28 3.71 3.50 2.90 2.52 3.03 2
 PCCP 4.27 4.03 3.74 3.70 3.14 3.33 2.97 3.87 3
Faces 4.29 4.06 3.44 4.00 3.65 3.42 2.77 3.32 4
Things 4.55 4.17 3.77 4.02 3.67 3.39 3.15 3.85 5
Male 4.30 4.05 3.74 3.93 3.56 3.24 2.74 3.38
Female 4.26 4.08 3.80 3.74 3.58 3.18 3.18 3.87
Fig. 3: The average answers to a variety of 5-point Likert questions.
Participants generally found their assigned authentication scheme easy to
use (Q1) and easy to remember (Q2,Q5), but not easier to remember than their
current passwords (Q6). PCCP was perceived significantly more difficult to re-
member (H(4.68, 97.25) = 3.21, p = .012). Perception of how fast password entry
is differs depending on the assigned scheme (Q3). PassPoints scores lowest. The
Text group perceives its scheme as being the fastest. Faces, Things and PCCP
are rated equally. Despite the low efficiency apparent from the interaction times,
the recognition-based schemes are still perceived to be faster than PassPoints.
These differences are significant (H(3.47, 20.45) = 3.43, p = .031). Overall, only
Things scores favorably in terms of a change towards it, though none of the
differences are significant (Q7). While the perceived gain in usability does not
seem to be large enough for the participants to happily adopt the new systems,
they would generally recommend them to others (Q8).
The analysis of question Q2 also revealed a significant interaction of all three
factors (assigned scheme, participants’ sex and session). While text passwords
always score lowest with the male participants, its rating from the female par-
ticipants steadily increases up to the point where it scores highest in the last
session. Faces preserves its ratings from the male participants over the course
of the sessions and scores the highest rating in the fifth session, but is rated
lowest by the female participants in all sessions except the fourth where it scores
second to last. Thus, the scheme female participants perceive to have the highest
memorability in the final session is rated lowest by the male participants and
the scheme rated highest by male participants is rated lowest by female partici-
pants. These differences seem however to to be purely subjective as they are not
mirrored by the actual performance of the participants.
8 Discussion
Configuring the different authentication schemes to the same effective password
space is an important aspect of this study’s methodology. This goal could only
be partially attained. Table 2 shows the target entropy values and the entropy
values calculated for the study passwords. For the Text scheme the target has
been reached with only a negligible discrepancy. The entropy for the cued-recall-
based schemes is lower than expected. The PassPoints entropy estimates for
each position in the password (6.15, 6.04, 5.74 and 6.28 bits) are lower than the
6.5 bits found by Dirik et al. in [9]. The individual estimates for PCCP (5.70,
5.85 and 5.80 bits) are even lower than those for PassPoints. The difference in
image resolution and tolerance margin size are crucial in this regard. However,
such entropy estimates have, to our knowledge, never been reported for PCCP
in published literature. Thus, a precise prediction of this loss in entropy was
hard if not impossible, especially when considering that user choice was further
restricted by omitting the shuffle mechanism. Chiasson et al. stated that there
are “no significant differences between PCCP and what is expected to occur by
chance” [30]. More research has to be conducted in order to find the relation
between their finding and the difference between effective password space and
theoretical password space discovered in this study.
The security analysis shows how difficult reliable estimation of the effective
password space is. However, empirical determination is the only way to gather
reliable data in this regard. The Shannon entropy values reported in this study
can provide estimates for future studies. Yet, whenever possible improved metrics
such as Bonneau’s α-guesswork should be used in favor of Shannon entropy.
The implications of the differences regarding the entropy among the schemes
are unclear. At best the differences are small enough to have no effect, although
this seems unlikely. At worst, the differences are the same as in other studies, re-
lying on the theoretical password space without any regard to the actual entropy.
It is important to keep these findings in mind when interpreting the usability
results. Though it has to be mentioned that due to the very small samples we
had, all empirically calculated metrics should only be seen as an approxima-
tion. This becomes especially clear when regarding the entropy estimates of the
recognition-based schemes, which should converge towards 28 bits of entropy in
larger samples, due to their random nature.
In the usability evaluation, no scheme emerges as the sole victor of our com-
parison. The recognition-based schemes have higher effectiveness ratings than all
other schemes. This advantage is interesting, as participants of Faces and Things
were assigned random passwords and the entropy of the passwords was higher
than for the cued-recall-based passwords. The cued-recall-based schemes have
better efficiency ratings, where the conceptually more complex scheme PCCP
scores even better than its predecessor PassPoints, especially in the later sessions.
The interaction times are the only measure in which the Text group scores best.
Text passwords scored worse than PCCP in terms of expected average timings
when intervals between logins were long, but this might be attributed to the
higher entropy in the text passwords.
The satisfaction ratings are mostly similar for all schemes, with two excep-
tions. Firstly, PassPoints is perceived to be slower than the recognition-based
schemes, despite its better efficiency scores. This emphasizes the usability prob-
lems participants had with the scheme. Secondly, when participants were asked
whether they preferred their new scheme, all schemes except Things score on av-
erage below 3 on a 5-point Likert scale. This notably includes the Text scheme.
It seems that participants are not very fond of their current text passwords, but
the alternative schemes offered to them in this study also do not represent their
first choice. Thus, further alternatives need to be evaluated in order to identify
the most suitable candidate.
One scheme clearly performs worst in basically all aspects: PassPoints. The
adjustment of the security-level according to the findings of Dirik et al. results
in low usability ratings overall. Consequently, it is safe to say that PassPoints
is unsuitable to function as password scheme on a relevant security-level and
can be excluded from future studies. For a meaningful comparison between the
remaining schemes and especially when considering one of the schemes for ac-
tual implementation in a production environment, the requirements of such an
environment play the most important role in judging the scheme’s suitability.
The password reset rate of the graphical schemes is significantly lower. There-
fore, in situations where recovery of lost passwords is expensive in time or effort,
graphical passwords seem to be the better choice. If the user tries to authenti-
cate using her/his text password at least once, then decides to reset the password
and the reset procedure takes only about 20 seconds (twice the time of a nor-
mal login), even recognition-based graphical schemes have the potential to be
more efficient than text passwords due to their superior memorability. However,
more research is needed to provide conclusive evidence in this regard, since no
reset timings were recorded in this study. For the recognition-based schemes only
two resets occurred in the course of this study and success rates are generally
higher, coming close to 100% even after longer periods of inactivity. Therefore,
they are best suited for applications in which logins are infrequent with long in-
tervals between them. In situations with more frequent logins, PCCP might be
the better choice. Success rates are equal to those of traditional text passwords,
interaction times are only somewhat elevated and the advantage in password re-
sets remains. The aspect of increased memorability becomes ever more relevant
when considering the login policies motivated by the online tracking efforts of
companies such as Google or Facebook. The expiration dates in the session cook-
ies of these popular services are usually set years into the future, so users will
remain logged in as long as possible. Therefore, the logins of users potentially
occur very infrequently on the same device.
Throughout the whole analysis we found no evidence for quantitative differ-
ences in the performance of male and female participants. Thus, the results of
earlier studies by Chiasson et al. [6] could not be replicated. The only aspect
where differences between male and female performance could be found is pass-
word creation. Male participants need fewer rounds in the training while spend-
ing less time to read the scheme instructions and find creation easier. However,
in opposition to what is stated by Chiasson et al., this difference in performance
seems not to be dependent on the type of mental work (visual-spatial tasks vs
linguistic tasks) as for none of these measures a significant interaction between
the assigned scheme and the participants’ sex can be found. Yet, the subjec-
tive differences in user satisfaction are present and might hinder adoption of
graphical passwords especially by male users.
Despite the overall success of this study, it has some limitations that need
to be addressed. To configure the effective password space we only considered
Shannon entropy. This is one of the most severe limitations of this study. Yet,
we argue that it is a necessary compromise we had to make in our first step
away from user studies regarding only the theoretical password space. While
not optimal, it was the only viable option to approximate the effective password
space. For future studies more reliable metrics such as α-guesswork have been
proposed in recent literature and should be used instead of Shannon entropy,
whenever empirical values allowing estimation of the effective password space
are available. Reporting these metrics was unfeasible due to the (for password
research) still small sample sizes in this study, but is planned for future work.
A restriction we imposed due to basic design decisions is the fixed length of
the passwords for all schemes. For the graphical password schemes this decision
was necessary in order to control the theoretical password space. For the text
passwords we added the same limitation in order to negate any discrepancies in
the usage of the different schemes. However, participants perceive this restriction
as unnatural and many wanted more flexibility. However, such flexibility can only
be incorporated in a methodology aiming at the same effective password space
if studies such as those conducted by Komanduri et al. [22] are available for all
schemes in a comparative study. This is obviously not the case for this study,
but is an important field for future work.
Also, the decision of comparing schemes with system-assigned passwords to
schemes which allow user choice might be considered a limitation of this study.
For all the schemes we tried to use implementations, as they might be used
for real-world applications. We followed the canonical implementations used in
recent studies and distributed as commercial products (user-choice in cued-recall-
based schemes and system-assigned passwords in recognition-based schemes).
Last but not least, it has to be noted that the methodology of this study
neglects one usability aspect, namely interference of multiple passwords. While
it has been shown that its influence is significant, it has been excluded in this
study, mainly due to time and recruitment constraints. Future studies should
optimally include this aspect.
9 Conclusion
This study compares four graphical authentication schemes and text passwords
in a user web-study. It is the first study of its kind to base the security configu-
ration of the tested schemes on the effective password space. An analysis of the
security assumptions once again shows how difficult the prediction of effective
password spaces is. The estimates reported in this work can serve as baseline for
configurations in future studies and represent an individual research contribu-
tion.
The results of the usability evaluation show that no scheme emerges as the
sole victor of this evaluation, but that all have strengths and weaknesses. Yet,
both types of graphical authentication schemes show fewer password resets than
the text passwords and in situations were these are costly graphical authenti-
cation seems to be the better choice. This is the first time such findings are
reported not only inside one category of graphical passwords, but across the
cued-recall-based and the recognition-based categories.
The results of Chiasson et al. indicating differences between male and female
performance in the usage of graphical password schemes could not be replicated
in this study. However, this study found significant differences in the attitude
of male and female participants. Additional research is needed in order to find
more evidence regarding this issue.
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A Statistical methods
The web-based nature of the study imposes some limitations on the data analysis.
Some timing values were highly elevated due to participants probably starting
the session and then being distracted by other tasks. Therefore, all timings are
analysed using medians, modified one-step M estimators (MOM) or trimmed
means instead of means. The modified one-step M estimator of location is a
measure of central tendency. It accounts for outliers which are determined using
the median absolute deviation. A detailed description of the modified one-step
M estimator is beyond the scope of this work, but Wilcox and Keselman wrote
an excellent introduction to measures of central tendency1.
All data collected throughout the study turned out to be non-normally dis-
tributed. Consequently, traditional parametric statistical procedures could not
be applied as even small deviations can cause a severe drop in power of F-statistic
tests [36]. The widely used non-parametric Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis
tests were not sufficient for the three-factor design of this study (assigned scheme,
sex of the participant and session). Furthermore, even for lower factor analyses
they can prove unsatisfactory. The Mann-Whitney test can only control the Type
I error rate under the assumption, that the groups have identical distributions
[36]. The Kruskal-Wallis test performs only well, if its null hypothesis is true.
Otherwise its statistical power is uncertain2.
Following the advice of Erceg-Hurn and Mirosevich [12] and Wilcox [36], the
following statistical methods are applied to scale data. In two-way designs, where
the data has no longitudinal factor (e.g. time taken to read instructions), Wilcox
advises a two-way ANOVA using modified one-step M estimators and a percentile
bootstrap. He provides the R procedure m2way to conduct the analysis. Using a
similar method is also suggested by Field [15]. Any follow-up tests are conducted
using a similar method with a percentile bootstrap and the MOM for two groups
(pbMOM). For all three-factor analyses the rank-based ATS described below is
used.
All ordinal data is analysed using rank-based methods. This type of data com-
prises all Likert-scale questions. As outlined above classical rank-based methods
are unsatisfactory. Therefore, instead of the Mann-Whitney test Cliff’s test is
used for the analysis. It performs well with small samples, can handle tied val-
ues and has a slight advantage over alternatives if many tied values appear [36].
Wilcox provides the R procedure cidv2 to conduct this test. Following the rec-
ommendations of Erceg-Hurn and Mirosevich in [12], the Kruskal-Wallis test
is substituted by the rank-based ANOVA-type statistic (ATS), which allows for
heteroscedastic data and tied values [36]. Wilcox provides the R procedure bdm to
conduct such a test. The non-longitudinal data with two independent variables is
analysed using the R procedure bdm2way provided by Wilcox, analogously to the
1 Wilcox, R.R., Keselman, H.J.: Modern Robust Data Analysis Methods: Measures of
Central Tendency. Psychological Methods 8(3), 254274 (2003)
2 Wilcox, R.R.: Modern Statistics for the Social and Behavioral Sciences: A Practical
Introduction. CRC Press (Jul 2011)
procedure bdm. Follow-up analyses are conducted using Cliff’s test. Wilcox pro-
vides no ATS procedures for longitudinal data. However, Noguchi et al. adapted
the ATS method and published their nparLD package for R in 2012 [25]. All
longitudinal data is analysed using their procedures.
All tests for independence were conducted using Fisher’s exact test due to the
robustness in cases with small contingency values. All multiple comparisons use
Bonferroni-Holm corrected α-levels. The p-values are given to the third decimal
place, if a p-value would be rounded to a value not representable with three
decimal places the term p < .001 is used.
B Detailed effectiveness and efficiency values
Table 3 gives a more detailed breakdown of the success rates for each scheme over
the course of the five sessions. The influence of the sessions become apparent.
The most obvious example are the values for PCCP in the fifth session, where
the success rate after the first attempt is about half of the overall success rate.
S 2 S 3 S 4 S 5
1st 3rd ∞ 1st 3rd ∞ 1st 3rd ∞ 1st 3rd ∞
Text 0.74 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.92 0.95 0.86 0.94 0.97 0.65 0.71 0.81
PassPoints 0.55 0.82 0.86 0.73 0.83 0.88 0.71 0.87 0.95 0.53 0.63 0.66
PCCP 0.59 0.76 0.93 0.65 0.85 1.00 0.65 0.82 0.93 0.47 0.70 0.90
Faces 0.86 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.97 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.97 1.00
Things 0.93 0.98 1.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.91 0.94
Male 0.76 0.90 0.94 0.80 0.94 0.97 0.80 0.93 0.98 0.65 0.79 0.86
Female 0.70 0.88 0.92 0.79 0.88 0.96 0.78 0.92 0.98 0.61 0.80 0.91
Table 3: The authentication success rates for each session after the first attempt
(1st), after the third attempt (3rd) and overall (∞); sessions S2-S5.
Table 4 lists all the interaction times and expected average total authentica-
tion times. The advantage of the Text group over PCCP in the interaction times
is eaten up by the higher number of attempts needed in the later sessions.
Interaction times Expected average
S 2 S 3 S 4 S 5 S 2 S 3 S 4 S 5 Overall
Text 9.7 7.6 7.1 8.0 11.7 7.6 8.6 14.7 8.9
PassPoints 13.7 14.1 13.3 15.3 13.7 14.1 13.9 19.3 14.3
PCCP 11.7 12.7 11.5 12.9 11.7 12.7 11.5 12.9 11.8
Faces 37.3 26.4 24.4 31.7 37.3 26.4 24.4 34.7 31.7
Things 29.5 24.7 26.2 32.4 31.2 24.7 26.2 43.2 28.0
Table 4: Interaction times and average total authentication times in seconds.
